Glyn Ford was a Member of the European Parliament for over 25 years (1984-2009). Serving on both the International Trade and Foreign Affairs Committee, particularly on dossiers related to Asia, Glyn was rapporteur for the Free-Trade Agreement with ASEAN, for implementing the Scientific Partnership Agreement with the Republic of Korea, as well as a ‘shadow’ rapporteur on the EU-Japan and EU-China trade agreements. He was also a member of the Delegation with the Japanese legislature (1984-2009) and the Korean Peninsula from its creation (2004-2009).

When he left the European Parliament in 2009, Glyn Ford founded the consulting company Polint, which he still leads today. In parallel, he continued his political and academic engagement with the DPRK and the East Asian region in the framework of his Brussels-based NGO Track2Asia.

Thanks to his engagement with the DPRK and his close to 50 visits to the country, he is now considered one of the most pre-eminent European experts on the Korean peninsula in particular, and East Asia in general. A sample of this expertise can be seen in his books “North Korea on the Brink” (Pluto Press, 2008 and later translated into Japanese and Korean) and “Talking to North Korea” (Pluto Press, 2018). Glyn Ford is also a Board Member of the North East Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF), as well as one of the European co-organisers of a number of Korean Global Forum (KGF) events.

The 2022 Institutional Awardee, Loyola Marymount University (LMU), a top-ranked national university with three campuses in Los Angeles, a global capital for arts and entertainment, innovation and technology, and business and entrepreneurship. Students and scholars thrive at LMU’s main, bluff-top campus in Westchester, LMU Loyola Law School in downtown L.A., and at LMU Playa Vista Campus, the creative center for graduate and professional education in Silicon Beach, where tech innovation thrives and the launching pad for LMU’s global imagination. LMU’s internationally acclaimed film and television, marketing, business, and engineering programs have developed a network of industry partnerships and internship opportunities. Ambitious international institutions such as Asia Media International, the Global Policy Institute, and LMU Center for International Business Education affirm the university’s vision and commitment to cosmopolitan education and a sense of the Asia Pacific as the 21st century economic and political powerhouse. LMU’s academically ambitious, multicultural, and socio-economically representative student body is recruited, retained and supported by a diverse faculty committed to the teacher-scholar model. Founded in 1911, LMU is a Catholic, Jesuit, and Marymount university that fosters diversity, equity, and inclusion with an academic community rich in opportunity for intellectual engagement and real-world experience. LMU President Timothy Law Snyder, Ph.D., will accept the award on behalf of the institution, its faculty, and its students.
In Korea, thinking about China

By Ambassador Kathleen Stephens

The Korean Air flight from Los Angeles landed at Incheon Airport early dawn the last Monday of November. I was on it, and I was nervous. I hadn’t been in Korea — or anywhere outside the U.S. — in almost two years. When I last departed Seoul in February 2020, a Korean friend gave me a small gift bag filled with KF-94 masks, saying, “You might need these.” What an understatement that turned out to be.

Now I was back, still wearing a KF-94 mask, this time from those received in a “care package” the Korea Foundation had mailed to former Peace Corps volunteers. The departure from Los Angeles had been fraught, Southern California’s mis-named “freeways” gridlocked and LAX airport choked with post-Thanksgiving travelers returning from long-postponed family reunions. Over Thanksgiving it had taken me multiple tries and many hours to navigate the chaotic PCR testing process at a local pharmacy, and the list of documents I’d need to present upon arrival in Korea was daunting.

But the flight was smooth, passed quickly by watching Korean movies, and Incheon Airport was immaculate and eerily quiet in the early dawn as we deplaned. There were numerous new pandemic-related layers of inspections, but they were thorough, efficient and professional. I was impressed. Dawn was breaking as I began the drive into Seoul, and before 9 a.m. I was outside a local health center for another PCR test. Again the process was well-organized. Standing in a quiet line under a chilly winter sky, Korea did seem like a Land of Morning Calm, especially after living through America’s disastrous Covid-19 experience, with over 800,000 deaths, including one out of every 100 Americans over age 65.

I’ve lived 11 years spread over four decades in Korea, and visited countless times. Every time I feel I must discover Korea anew; the proverb “In 10 years, even the mountains and rivers change,” is literally true in Korea, and even an understatement. I quickly realized that this time, I had to pay especially close attention; digital contact with Korea, including hundreds of hours on Zoom and other online platforms, had left out a lot.

I was struck by the depth of weariness in Korea with the pandemic and the way it has disrupted and intruded into every aspect of life, further exacerbated by the unpredictable and worrisome impact of the Omicron variant. Korea’s public health system and bureaucratic competence may be envied by those of us who live in countries where we don’t take these things for granted. But from Koreans, I heard that “Covid blue” (depression) was bleeding into “red” (anger) and “black” (despair). Korean resilience and adaptability in responding to the challenges of the past two years is more appreciated from the outside than in Korea itself. The viruses of disinformation, politicization, and polarization are circulating in Korea, too, though at this point not as virulently as elsewhere.

I found worry in Korea about a lot of other things in addition to when and how the Covid-19 crisis will play itself out. A presidential election widely viewed as uninspiring or worse. Narrowing economic opportunities for the rising generation. Korea’s multiple generation gaps. Feminism and anti-feminism. Questions about America’s future direction, and whether it will include Trump or Trumpism. What’s next with a self-isolated North Korea. Are the U.S. and China headed for a cold war, or a hot one. Why the Biden Administration hasn’t gotten around to nominating a new ambassador to South Korea, especially given the priority attached to the alliance. All topics for more dialogue, preferably increasingly in-person. And for some future columns.

But I departed Korea after two weeks thinking that, above all, Koreans and Americans need to talk more with each other about China, and the reshaping of our respective understanding of and relationships with China. This is the big strategic shift in the global landscape, and we need to explore it candidly and continuously, among and between our two countries, at every level of the public and private sectors.

The problem is neither Korea nor the United States have a coherent “China policy.”

South Korea’s used to be relatively simple: Korea looked to China as a key economic partner and essential to hopes for inter-Korean progress; the United States was the security partner and ally. It was never as simple as it looked, and now the “China for the economy, U.S. for security” formulation has frayed. The economic space has been securitized. Most of the lines between economic and commercial activities and the security sphere have blurred or even disappeared, as we see in policy priorities to establish trusted supply chains and protect sensitive technology and intellectual property, or in the heavy-handed economic punishment China has meted (continued on page 3)
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out to South Korea and Australia for security policies it dislikes. South Korean public sentiment toward China has turned strongly negative. But South Korea must also consider the important Beijing-Pyongyang relationship, and Korea’s own geographical proximity and long and complex historical ties with China. Whoever wins the March presidential election, the new president will continue to face the challenge of positioning South Korea on a range of issues with China-related implications, from the Quad to Taiwan to the South China Sea.

It’s hard to remember now, but the United States national security strategy shift from one based on counterterrorism (the poorly-named “Global War on Terror”) to great power rivalry is relatively recent. Under Biden the early emphasis has been on strengthening alliances and partnerships, especially in Asia, and building multilateral cooperation through the Quad, AUKUS, and more. Secretary of State Tony Blinken gave a speech titled “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in Indonesia on Dec. 14 which was described by the New York Times as “downplaying direct confrontation” between the United States and China making a “soft-power” pitch that the United States is a better bet as a partner than China.

To me, and likely to many in Korea and throughout Asia, this is a welcome approach, as was the softer discourse of the Biden-Xi virtual summit on Nov. 15. But just as the Biden-Xi summit did not alter the established “strategic competition” lens through which Washington sees U.S.-China relations, Blinken’s speech mention of a “comprehensive Indo-Pacific economic framework” under development in Washington did not assuage the criticism that the United States has been missing-in-action on the trade front since withdrawing from the TPP. Nonetheless, Blinken and other officials have outlined a wide range of issues on which the U.S. is looking for greater cooperation with allies like South Korea, including supply chain resiliency, clean energy, decarbonization, infrastructure, democracy, vaccines and much more. Perhaps such functional cooperation, important in its own right, can help address regional and global challenges. But many will require a complicated public-private sector approach. And they fall short of being an articulated “China policy.”

I was a senior official at the State Department’s East Asia Bureau in 2005 when then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick gave the speech in which he coined the term “responsible stakeholder” to describe our hoped-for future for China and U.S.-China relations. The Chinese even back then never liked the term; for one it was very difficult to translate, and perhaps found it condescending, or insincere. But I think it would be infinitely harder to have a “China speech” now, or to come up with a term to replace that earlier, discarded one. That’s probably why we got the “Indo-Pacific” speech first.

More important than a single speech or summit, what I take from my two weeks in Korea is that Americans and Koreans need to have continual, deep conversations about China, about our respective histories and relationships, and about our shared futures. Perhaps we can begin with a book club: On my flight back to Washington I took a break from Korean movies to reread a short 2021 book by Yale University Professor Odd Arne Westad entitled “Empire and Righteous Nation: 600 Years of China-Korea Relations.”

Westad dedicates the book, “To the united and peaceful Korea of the future.”

To achieve that future, we need to understand and better deal with the dangerous moment we are in. We’ll need some history for that.

This opinion piece featuring PCI Board Member, Gregory F. Treverton was published in the Los Angeles Times on December 26, 2021.

Does the Biden administration deserve a passing grade in foreign policy?

By Gregory F. Treverton

Senior officials in charge of foreign policy in the Biden administration have spent 2021 seeking to return America to activism in multilateral institutions and to restore its global reputation as a leader and its image as both competent and reliable after the hapless chest-thumping of the previous administration.

Unhappily, the first year has not been kind to their efforts or their president. I say this as someone who was a colleague of many of these officials when I chaired the National Intelligence Council during the Obama administration — and who admires them.

They had bad luck with Afghanistan, not least inheriting the Trump agreement with the Taliban in 2020 promising a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops; it was little more than a
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fig leaf covering surrender.

But the U.S. also had bad execution. The administration was pressured by the Afghan government to avoid taking action that would bespeak departure, yet the U.S. still should have done much more than it did to prepare for the withdrawal by the end of August, especially to get out the Afghans who had worked with us. The military usually excels at quickly moving people, but in this case it did not.

If we were given a do-over, we might have kept the Bagram air base open in Afghanistan even if it meant temporarily deploying more troops to defend it.

I was also surprised — after we saw the Iraqi army evaporate in the fall of Mosul in 2014 — that my former colleagues in intelligence didn’t at least warn of the strong possibility that the endgame in Afghanistan might play out in days or weeks, not months or years. My years in intelligence have left me skeptical of assessments that are too convenient, such as the one suggesting the Afghan regime could hold on for months.

The Biden team is experienced and able, and that is a welcome relief. Yet they are also card-carrying members of the foreign policy establishment, what Ben Rhodes, who was a deputy national security advisor to President Obama, calls the “blob” (and which probably also includes me). I sometimes have the impression they think this is still 1992, when the U.S. was having a unipolar moment as the global superpower.

The world has changed. This is not a time when we should be lecturing Chinese diplomats, as Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken did in March in Anchorage, no matter how much they deserve it or respond in kind with lectures of their own.

Nor can U.S. leadership be assumed; it has to be earned, issue by issue, and decision by decision. On that score, conniving with London to sell Australia British nuclear submarines, rather than the French models they had ordered, and to do so with no prior warning to France, was a gaffe which neither a President Biden apology nor a visit to Paris in early November by Vice President Kamala Harris could erase.

Traditional allies are bound to hedge their bets: Having witnessed the “America First” Trumpism once, they know our politics well enough to know it could happen again.

There is more foreign policy continuity between Biden and former President Trump than I expected. Biden reversed two of three Trump withdrawals, taking the country back into the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization.

But what is more arresting is that he did not rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership. That should have been a natural, for it is the perfect vehicle for doing what the Trump administration sought but failed to do: Make progress in curbing the various ways China appropriates intellectual property, which includes requiring foreign businesses to share their technology in exchange for market access — and many reports of outright theft.

The first rounds of Trump tariffs may have gotten China’s attention, but the follow-up was negative: Rather than rallying countries in Europe and elsewhere that share the same grievance against China, the Trump administration levied tariffs on those would-be partners as well, apparently for reasons unconnected to China. Yet the fact that the Biden administration has made nary a peep about rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership underscores the constraints now that trade agreements have become dirty words across the political spectrum.

Russia’s massing of troops on Ukraine’s border, which began in November, will test the administration. It stands in testimony to the fact that a declining power can still be locally preeminent militarily — and to the risk that the Biden administration could simultaneously face crises in Europe and Asia. Never mind that if the foreign policy establishmentarians seem to think it’s still 1992, Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to think it’s still 900.

By harking back to Kievan Rus — a medieval state that some say was the precursor to the modern states of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus — Putin is asserting that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. It may be an acceptable historical reference but it is an unwise strategy, for it only offends Ukrainians and drives them further toward the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

China plainly is the center of American foreign policy, and on that score, too, there seems more continuity than strategy. The Biden administration did not move to rescind the Trump tariffs but applied punitive measures of its own, such as delisting Chinese companies from U.S. stock exchanges and not sending officials to the Olympics in China.

While the administration obviously understands that if humanity is to survive, we must cooperate with China in

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Eight outstanding and highly motivated high school juniors and seniors attending various schools in the Greater Los Angeles Area were selected as this year’s Project Bridge Youth Ambassadorship Program.

Since the start of the program, the Youth Ambassadors have learned about the premodern Korean history, culture and society, and a joint Korean language session with New York and Montana groups. They are looking forward to upcoming field trips, workshops, and the ten-day study tour to South Korea.

The Sejong Research Institute held the 2nd Sejong Defense Forum on December 22, 2021 with the theme of ‘Unfinished Defense Reform, Achievements and Future Tasks’. This forum was held by Ho-Young Jin, Defense Reform Advisory Committee member of the Ministry of National Defense, and Jong-Dae Kim, a visiting professor at the Institute for National Unification at Yonsei University (former member of the Justice Party).

The first presentation was made by Ho-Young Jin under the theme of ‘The Current State of Defense Reform and its Development Direction: Focusing on the Unit Structure’. First, he discussed the necessity of defense reform and looked at the defense reform of advanced foreign forces such as the US, Germany, France, and the UK with a focus on the unit structure. Meanwhile, by analyzing and evaluating the defense reforms of successive governments, he talked about the path that the Republic of Korea’s defense reform should take in the future.

Jong-dae Kim gave a second presentation under the theme of ‘Concept and Direction of Defense Reform 3.0’. Professor Kim first pointed out that the existing defense systems and classic military platforms are meaningless on the battlefield due to the development of technology. He acknowledged that we should be wary of the promise that technology will bring everything, but warned that there is a greater risk if we get stuck in the rigidity of thinking that does not accept new technologies.

After the two presentations, a general discussion followed. In the comprehensive discussion, military experts from various fields, including the military, government, and media, continued in-depth discussions on defense reform.
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addressing the climate crisis, otherwise the “new Cold War” mentality that appears to grip Washington seems to include the administration as well. That is a very unhelpful frame — more 1962 than 2022 — for not only does it narrow the scope for cooperation with China, it also downplays the economic importance of the two countries to each other.

Political calculations may suggest hyping the “China threat” to sell measures for renewal at home that we should do even if China didn’t exist, such as spending more on basic research and development on critical technologies, just as President Eisenhower used the Cold War in the 1950s to justify the National Highway Defense Act, which built the U.S. interstate system so that in the event of a nuclear attack people could easily evacuate cities.

But slogans are not strategy, and on the Biden administration’s first-year report card, its approach toward China earns it an “incomplete” in foreign policy.