The Pacific Century Institute is awarding Ambassador Kathleen Stephens the Building Bridges Award at its annual dinner on February 24 for her lifelong dedication to understanding other peoples and cultures and her adroit application of that understanding during her long and important career in the diplomatic service of the United States.

Ambassador Stephens not only deserves the Building Bridges Award, she epitomizes it. If we didn't have the award, we might have to create something just like it so we could give it to her.

Consider the wording under which the award was created in 2000. It was "to honor those who have enhanced relations between Americans and Asians and who exemplify the Pacific Century Institute's commitment to building bridges to a better future."

Building Bridges of understanding to a better future is exactly what Ambassador Stephens has done her entire life, both before and after becoming a career diplomat.

Currently, as Ambassador to Korea, Kathleen Stephens enjoys a great personal popularity in that country...and for good reason. Using her Korean language skills, Ambassador Stephens talks to the man in the street, using her blog she communicates with young netizens, and appearing on television talk shows to discuss her favorite Korean writers, she extends her reach well beyond the normal confines of the US-ROK alliance. Ambassador Stephens is one of the reasons that Korean-American relations are at their best in a long time.

But Ambassador Stephens is not new to extending herself and reaching out to the world. After college Ambassador Stephens chose to learn more about the world outside the American Southwest, where she grew up. She joined the Peace Corps in 1975 and was assigned to Korea, where she taught at a middle school in Yesan, South Chungcheong province for two years. That is where she came to be known by her Korean name, Shim Eun-gyeong (심은경). If fact, if you are looking for her blog, don't look in English, and don't look under the name Stephens. Look for Ms. Shim.

While at Yesan, Ambassador Stephens got permission from the school principal to take off one day to travel to Seoul to take the Foreign Service Exam at the US Embassy there. The principal said she could go, but only if she passed the exam. She did. As Ambassador Stephens was to remark thirty-two years later after being named ambassador to Seoul, "Yesan is where I learned the qualities I needed to be a diplomat. I had warm-hearted colleagues who were there for me, and students who studied hard despite many difficulties. I learned how to endure hardships and convince others, which are essential for a diplomat."

Ambassador Stephens also served five years in Korea in the 1980s, first as the chief of the internal political unit at the Embassy, where she witnessed and reported on the dramatic events of democratization in 1987, and then as Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Pusan.

Knowing Korea and understanding the desire of young people everywhere to see the world, Ambassador Stephens has been a driving force in implementing the innovative WEST visa program. Standing for work, English study and travel, a WEST visa allows up to 5000 Korean students annually to come to the US for English language training and coursework focusing on American business practices and corporate culture followed by an internship at an American...
company commensurate with the student’s interests and abilities. Ample time is built-in for extensive independent travel. Speaking to the first group of WEST visa participants before they left Korea, Ambassador Stephens gave them this advice, "Get out of your comfort zone...Do something that is a little harder. If you have always lived in a big city, think about living in a small city or even the countryside. If you have always thought you wanted to work in a very large company, think about a small one and see what that is like. This is a time to get, and stay, outside of your comfort zone...This is about something that goes beyond the classroom and the workplace into an experience that you will take with you for the rest of your life."

Also, implementing the visa waiver program for short term visits to the US, Ambassador Stephens has been able to get rid of the infamous lines around the US Embassy in Seoul and Korean visitors to the US rose from some 600,000 in 2009 to approximately a million in 2010.

Ambassador Stephens' encounters with the outside world and her building of bridges have not been confined to Korea. In college she studied in Hong Kong as an exchange student and later she was the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal.

But Ambassador Stephens' bridge building skills were especially put to the test in some very volatile, very complex and at the Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal.

She was involved with the Good Friday Agreement that ended decades of ugly and bloody violence in Northern Ireland. The agreement was signed in 1998 while Ambassador Stephens was serving as the US Consul General in Belfast.

If that were not enough, after personally witnessing the death, destruction and chaos of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s in a very close up way while assigned at the US Missions in Belgrade and Zagreb, Ambassador Stephens was a key participant in the post-conflict stabilization of the region. She served as both Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibility for reconciliation in the Balkans.

During her assignment as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2005 to 2007, Ambassador Stephens was the chief lieutenant to Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill and directly oversaw relations with Japan and Korea. If you will remember, this was a time of considerable progress with North Korea at the Six-Party talks.

So...the Korean Peninsula, Northern Ireland, the Balkans -- Kathleen Stephens has not shied away from the difficult. The United States, and the world, are fortunate to have a diplomat like Kathleen Stephens who decided early on in her life to open her mind and her heart -- and to leave her comfort zone far behind -- so that she could build bridges of understanding that lead to a better future.

Prof. Plate is the author of seven books, including “Confessions of an American Media Man” (2nd Edition, 2009, Marshall Cavendish) and is currently working on a series of political portraits titled “Giants of Asia.”

The first in that series - “Conversations With Lee Kuan Yew” - was a bestseller in Southeast Asia last year.

"Conversations With Mahathir Mohamad," volume 2 of Giants of Asia series by Prof. Plate, is due in February. The book is based on 8 hours of interview, 4 sessions of two hours each, with Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in either Putrajaya, the administrative capital of Malaysia, or in his office at the top of Petronas Tower number one in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia.

Dr. Mahathir, a medical doctor by training and credentialing, has served as the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia for 22 years from 1981 to 2003.

The Chinese (simplified) edition of book one “Conversations With Lee Kuan Yew” will be available in all Chinese sectors of Asia, including the mainland.
Timing is everything in politics, war and peace. President Barack Obama and the world were extremely lucky to have had Gov. Bill Richardson in Pyongyang just when he was. His visit coincided with what I consider to have been the most dangerous moment in relations between North and South Korea since 1994, the “sea of fire” crisis, which was ended only by an emergency visit to Pyongyang by former President Jimmy Carter.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, facing heavy domestic criticism for what had been perceived as an inadequate response to the Nov. 23 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea, felt he had to prove his toughness and his leadership to his own people, his neighbors, and his major ally, the U.S. He proposed to do by holding a second live-fire exercise from Yeonpyeong Island, the first of which had provoked the North Koreans to fire in response, causing the first two civilian casualties suffered by South Korea since 1953. North Korea played into President Lee’s hands by its foolish and tragic barrage. South Korean anger was aroused, and long-standing doubts about who sank the Cheonan last March, were submerged. In short order, North Korea became the villain of the piece.

Gov. Richardson, making his eighth trip to North Korea, at the invitation of Kim Gye-gwan, the North’s chief nuclear negotiator, arrived in Pyongyang in the midst of this developing crisis. South Korea’s live-fire exercise had been announced, and North Korea was outdoing itself in the retaliatory threats it was issuing, including nothing less than a reference to the possible use of nuclear weapons.

Gov. Richardson said he “hoped to make a difference” in bringing a more stable situation into being, and settled down to substantive talks with men he knew well. A trickle of sensible-sounding suggestions soon surfaced; establishment of a three-way military commission involving the U.S. and North and South Korea, to study crisis avoidance; setting up a “hot line” between the North and the South; the return of recently discovered remains of American soldiers killed in the Korean War; possible resumption of visits by IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon, and sale of enriched nuclear fuel rods to foreign buyers, including South Korea.

In Seoul, the seriousness of the situation was demonstrated by an unusual event. On Dec. 18, U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, accompanied by Combined Forces Commander Gen. Walter Sharp called upon President Lee at the Blue House. In what the Dong-a Ilbo called “an emergency visit,” the ambassador and the general reportedly told the president to be prepared for a provocative military reaction from North Korea, if the live-fire exercise on Yeonpyeong Island were to be carried out. Following this meeting, the Blue House announced that the exercise would be held. Its timing and duration were announced. The strength of the U.S.-Korean alliance had thus been demonstrated: Despite dire threats from the North, the exercise was definitely going to happen, and the world went to bed on Dec. 19 wondering how North Korea would respond.

In Pyongyang, Gov. Richardson had concluded his talks, after repeatedly urging the North Koreans not to respond militarily to the South Korean exercise. In a telephone interview with CNN from the airport, he referred to the situation as “a tinderbox.”

From my five trips to Pyongyang, I know most, if not all, of the men the governor met and talked with. They are extremely intelligent, tough negotiators, with a strong sense of what is possible and what is not. They clearly recognized that all of the positive ideas discussed with Gov. Richardson would be obliterated by a hostile military response, executed on the day of his departure, and that his visit would be taken by Pyongyang’s myriad of critics as further proof of the uselessness of talking directly with North Korea. Their choice not to retaliate, despite the dire threats they had issued, is a wise decision that puts the ball in Washington’s court.

I would hope that Gov. Richardson would be invited to the White House and listened to carefully. His visit has brought strong evidence of the value of direct talks with North Korea, the key to long-term stability on the Korean Peninsula. They clearly need to be continued.

Donald P. Gregg is PCI Board member and chairman Emeritus of the Korea Society. He was national security advisor to Vice President George H.W. Bush (1982-88) and ambassador to South Korea (1989-93).
Japan Reacts to North Korea’s Shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island

Faced with impasses over matters pertaining to crucial economic and diplomatic policies in the past, Japan – generally considered a “reactive” state – has often bowed to “gaiatsu” (literally “pressure from overseas”) to grudgingly implement required changes.

However, a new round of “gaiatsu” – such as China’s blatant denial of Japan’s sovereign territory in September and North Korea’s deadly artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea in November – has prompted a significant percentage of Japanese to proactively take a stern look at their nation’s foreign relations, with an emphasis on the strain in the U.S.-Japan security ties, as a step towards becoming a more mature nation.

Significantly, the Yeonpyeong shelling incident came on the heels of a dispute between Japan and China resulting from a violation by a Chinese fishing trawler of Japanese waters off Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea on September 7. The trawler rammed into two Japan Coast Guard patrol ships and its captain was detained on charges of violation of Japanese territorial waters and obstruction of official duties. Under mounting pressure from the Chinese government which, among others, suspended the export of rare metal, Japan subsequently released the captain without pressing charges.

Unrelated though these two incidents may seem, many thoughtful Japanese believe a common cause links the two incidents – what they regard as a perception on the part of North Korea and China of the “weakening” of the once solid U.S.-Japan alliance which constituted the cornerstone of East Asian security framework. This, these Japanese surmise, must have allowed China to assume that the U.S. is no longer fully committed to protecting Senkaku Islands under terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Actually, Foreign Secretary Clinton declared to the contrary on October 30 in a meeting with her Japanese counterpart. They further believe a similar perception must have prompted North Korea to attempt to get away with the artillery shelling in late November, as well as the sinking of the South Korean navy patrol ship Cheonan in March, without U.S. involvement. In fact, Japanese observers believe North Korea has over the years been steadfastly working out a strategy under the premise that it will one day be able to fight a conventional war against South Korea minus U.S. troops – and win.

The popular sentiment here is highly critical of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration, but the liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which went out of power in the fall of 2009 has yet to regain enough public confidence to return to power. Japanese generally share a keen sense of crisis over the Korean Peninsula including a possible implosion of the North Korean regime, and are immensely frustrated by the inept leadership of the DPJ administration, especially in terms of its unskilled diplomacy, which has seriously impaired the U.S.-Japan security relationship as it tried in vain to develop an “equal” relationship with the United States without being able to work out any concrete policy.

The DPJ’s desire to proclaim Japan “independent” from the U.S. by pursuing an “equal” relationship was evidenced in a pledge Yukio Hatoyama, the DPJ’s first premier, had made while campaigning to topple the LDP government in 2009 that the Futenma U.S. Marine Air Base in Japan’s southernmost Okinawa prefecture will be “at least removed” from Okinawa – contrary to an agreement reached between the U.S. and Japan in 1996 that the base will be relocated to the Henoko district in Nago city in northern Okinawa, as well as his announcement that Japan would strive to form the East Asian Community in tandem with China and excluding the U.S.

However, the Futenma situation has since come to a standstill for the DPJ administration of Naoto Kan, who took over from Hatoyama in September. For one thing, Nago City, which had once agreed to accommodate the base, now has a new mayor adamantly opposed to the base’s relocation. Meanwhile, Governor of Okinawa Hirokazu Nakaima, who had once favored the relocation plan, has had a change of mind and now wants the base removed from his prefecture.

Thoughtful Japanese believe it was against such a backdrop that the Senkaku incident and the North Korean shelling occurred, with the controversial visit to the Russian-occupied northern Japanese island of Kunashiri by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in between. Behind the spate of these incidents was a perceived weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance which once formed the foundation of the East Asian security framework.

Japanese generally are highly critical of Hatoyama for having hurt U.S.-Japan security ties by being too eager to pursue “an equal relationship” with the U.S. There has been mounting frustration among ordinary Japanese over the inept leadership of the DPJ administration under which Japan truly lost its way in 2010 – not only diplomatically. The North Korean shelling incident has laid bare the administration’s ill-preparedness to safeguard Japan’s security should North Korea launch a Yeonpyeong-like attack anywhere in the Japanese archipelago, say the southernmost main island of Kyushu, depending on its precarious internal situation.

The average Japanese assumes North Korea is capable of attacking Japan with its Taepodong missiles some of which they are told are already aimed at Japan, possibly mounted with nuclear warheads when the North succeeds in developing them, and feel seriously imperiled. Fortunately, there are signs that DPJ law makers are awakening – albeit painfully slowly – to the realization that, despite Hatoyama’s infatuation with the idea of “independence,” Japan after all should treasure – and further – its relationship with the U.S., as well as the other free democracies in Asia, especially South Korea, Australia, and India, and that it should materially and mentally start preparing for future contingencies that may befall their nation at any time.

(continued on page 5)
Encyclopedia Britannica Blog interviewed PCI Board Member Dr. Chung-in Moon on December 8, 2010. Below is Dr. Moon’s response to the key question asked.

Britannica: North Korea’s nuclear weapons program represents one of the most potentially destabilizing forces on the Korean Peninsula (and the world for that matter). Kim Jong Il has been a master of agreeing to halt the program or subject it to international checks while extracting aid concessions through the Six-Party Talks (North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States).

Invariably, the perception in the West is that he always goes back on the agreement eventually, forcing the talks to start from scratch. How accurate is that perception, and if you could look into Kim Jong Il’s mind, what is it that he wants from the talks?

Moon: I do not agree with your observation. This is a typical Western perception that is grossly misguided and distorted. A careful analysis of North Korea’s behavior shows an unusual consistency. North Korea has been rather reactive than proactive or provocative.

Whenever the six-party talks failed to deliver what was promised during the negotiations, the North is said to show what we call ‘rogue behavior.’ Extracting aid concession from six-party talk members is not its goal. To my knowledge, North Korea is seeking the nuclear path in order to secure a minimal nuclear deterrence against the United States. When I interviewed North Korean leaders, they truly believed that the United States would attack North Korea with its tactical nuclear weapons.

Another rationale behind its pursuit of nuclear weapons is closely related to a growing gap in the conventional arms race with South Korea, whose national defense budget is nearly equal to North Korea’s gross domestic product. North Korea’s obsession with asymmetric forces (e.g., nuclear, biochemical, special commando forces) reflects its concern with the inferiority of its conventional arms.

The nuclear weapons card is also being used as an instrument to enhance Chairman Kim Jong Il’s domestic legitimacy because North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons not only enhances its international status but also facilitates the realization of ‘a strong and prosperous great nation.’ And Kim Jong Il is also pursuing ‘military first politics,’ in which the nuclear weapons can be used as an effective tool for co-opting the military.

Extracting concession or export earnings are not principal goals. And, I do not agree with the Western characterization of North Korea as an extorting or ruthless concession-seeking nation. North Korea argues that it is its sovereign right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that if the United States, Japan, and South Korea want the cancellation of its nuclear programs, they should compensate its energy losses. That is why the six-party talks have agreed to provide the North with heavy oil.

I am not taking North Korea’s side, but it is very important to analyze claims from both sides in an objective manner. But so far, the West, especially the United States, has been demonizing North Korea and has blamed only the North for all the setbacks and stalemates. Addressing North Korea’s authentic concerns, not contrived ones through Western biases, stereotype, and mirror image, should be the first step toward resolving the North Korean nuclear quagmire.

What Kim Jong Il wants from the talks is the assurance of peace and security, especially from the United States, through the termination of hostile relations and diplomatic normalization. Thus, turning North Korea into a normal state as well as creating a peace regime on the Korean peninsula would constitute essential steps toward realization of the verifiable dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programs and weapons. He would also want foreign direct investment and development assistance from the outside for economic revitalization.

Japan Reacts...
(continued from page 4)

In fact, Japan recently announced its new defense guidelines refocusing its defense strategy on the rise of China and calling for a stronger alliance with its biggest ally, the U.S., and seeking closer security networks with partners like South Korea and Australia. The Defense Ministry has announced Japan will also acquire new submarines and fighter jets, upgrade its missile defense capabilities and make its ground forces more mobile so as to quickly respond to emergencies in southwest Japan.

The good news is also that average Japanese citizens are miles ahead of politicians in their zeal to find answers to what Japan should do as a responsible member of the Asian community in contributing to regional security and prosperity. Obviously, the Japanese are belatedly awakening to the tough reality of Asian surrounding their nation – perhaps for the first time since the end of the Pacific war. The tide in Japan appears to be finally turning for its own benefit, as well as for future stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. If all this is thanks to the recent “gaiatsu,” China and North Korea – and perhaps Russia – may deserve a thank you note from the Japanese government.

PCI Board member and Japan representative Ko Shioya contributed this report from Tokyo.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA: THE IMPACT OF UNTESTED ASSUMPTIONS

A Western diplomat was quoted recently as observing that “We know more about distant galaxies than we do about North Korea.” While this observation clearly is an exaggeration, it demonstrates just how baffled most Western observers, especially Americans, are by what North Koreans say and do. Further, in an admixture of cause and effect, the routine ‘demonization’ of North Korea in American mass media offers fertile grounds for a constant barrage of untested or unproved assumptions that only further exacerbate the state of confusion. Rather than improving our understanding of North Korean objectives for its relationship with the U.S. or with South Korea and Japan, the two major allies of the U.S. in the region, the powers of imagination that many Americans bring to bear in their efforts to discern the enigma that is North Korea often serve primarily to deepen the misunderstanding.

In an attempt to move beyond this impasse, with financial support from the Pacific Century Institute and Ambassador Donald P. Gregg, the Korean Peninsula Affairs Center at Syracuse University convened a workshop organized by Professor Jongwoo Han on November 15, 2010 to explore the topic of “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Assumptions Untested or Unproved.” The workshop was intended to highlight the need to sort out what we know or don’t know about North Korea with an intellectual rigor paralleling that applied to the understanding of other phenomenon such as, for example, distant galaxies. In this instance, though, the process of discovery is not related in any way to rocket science. Rather, it is only a matter of analyzing all available information in a rational and objective manner, instead of parroting unexamined verities based on assumptions that seem to be beyond challenge only because of deeply-ingrained habits of the heart. It also requires recognizing that these habits are grounded in a profoundly non-empathetic perspective stemming from the ‘demonization’ that governs almost all official thinking about North Korea in the United States.

The workshop was divided into a morning and an afternoon session. Each session included three presentations that were followed by brief reactions from discussants, a lengthy Q&A period and an overall summary. A report on the workshop will be published shortly with full particulars on the participants, the presentations and the ensuing discussions. As a preview, the following is a sampling of the issues raised by the presenters in response to the topic of the workshop.

Gari Ledyard, professor emeritus of Korean studies at Columbia University, opened the morning session with remarks sketching out the differences between ‘The Party of Memory’ and ‘The Party of Forgetting’, as Bruce Cumings has epitomized the contrast between North Korea and the U.S. While there is never a perfect parallel between ‘memory’ and ‘truth’ or ‘forgetting’ and ‘falsity’ in human affairs, the emergence of empathetic understanding is effectively precluded when historical context is either cynically manipulated or cavalierly ignored.

Ralph Cossa, president of Pacific Forum CSIS, addressed the challenges facing the security architecture of Northeast Asia, especially in terms of the evolution of alliance relationships. The impact of untested or unproved assumptions is especially virulent in managing these challenges as core interests of all the political actors in the region are contingent on these relationships. In the end, of course, all actors need to do a better job of clarifying their intentions to avoid any further exacerbation of the zero sum strategic maneuvering already emerging among the parties in the region.

Margaret Herman, professor of political science and director of the Moynihan Institute, addressed the dilemma posed for policymakers by the diametrically opposed perceptions of Kim Jong II as either unstable and paranoid or a leader who is detail-oriented and a master politician. One way of overcoming the constraints of these conflicting perceptions, Herman argued, is to use assessment-at-a-distance techniques to examine Kim Jong II’s leadership style in a more empirical or objective way. The application of these techniques reveals a rational pattern of shifting leadership styles triggered by changes in the political context.

The afternoon session began with a presentation by Scott Snyder, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy of the Asia Foundation. Observing that the need for increased dialogue with North Korea ironically is underscored by the declining expectations for the efficacy of such a dialogue, Snyder outlined a series of bilateral steps that would enhance the prospects for a return to the Six Party Talks. Again, as in other areas, the impasses created by reigning assumptions usually can be overcome by a rational analysis of the oftentimes self-contradictory nature of these assumptions. As an example,
the current stalemate in engagement efforts might ‘lock-in’ a perception that North Korea’s neighbors have accepted its declared status as a nuclear weapons state.

Mary E. Lovely, professor of economics in the Maxwell School, gave a presentation in which trade mirror data from receiving countries was employed to assess the state of North Korea’s indigenous industrial capability. There is perhaps no help for it, but Lovely’s findings seemed to confirm the stereotype of her academic discipline. At the same time, however, the findings also confirmed the feasibility of assessing the current state and future prospects of the North Korea economy in a systematic way, instead of simply relying on anecdotal accounts by defectors or observations made by occasional visitors to the country.

The final presentation was by Jae-Jung Suh, associate professor and director of Korea Studies in SAIS at Johns Hopkins University, who delivered a very hard-hitting refutation of the evidence presented by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group in support of its finding that the Ch’ŏnan sinking in March 2010 was caused by a North Korean torpedo. While the presentation was controversial, and even offensive to some workshop participants, its objective was to suggest the need for a further investigation of the incident. Ultimately, as most observers would agree, the critical challenge is to devise a political strategy for moving beyond this tragedy to allow a resumption of dialogue among all the parties.

As these brief vignettes show, the workshop touched on a wide array of issues that are central to the efforts to formulate sound North Korea policies. The goal was not to discover a guile-free way to uncover the ‘truth’ about North Korea, but to highlight the advantages of a dispassionate consideration of the evidence even if it means that some of the most negative stereotypes of North Korea ultimately are called into question and perhaps even refuted.

Frederick F. Carriere is adjunct professor of political science and PCI senior fellow of the Korean Peninsula Affairs Center in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. He also is a consulting professor in the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

Green University Conference in Vietnam

An international conference was held in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, on December 3-4, 2010 to advance plans for the creation of a new private university in Vietnam to be called Tri Viet University. Previous conferences had led to the general conclusion that Tri Viet should be a “Green” university. The goal of this conference, entitled “What makes a ‘Green’ University: Defining Tri Viet University’s Green Ambition”, was to define the notion of university sustainability in the context of Vietnam.

The conference was organized by the Tri Viet Center for Education Research and Development, which is developing the university. The driving force behind the concept of this new 21st century private university for Vietnam and director of the Center is Ambassador Ton Nu Thi Ninh.

The conference was quite interesting and animated, and Madam Ninh and her colleagues seemed pleased with the outcome and ready to move on to implementation considerations.

PCI Board Member Lloyd Armstrong, who represented PCI at the conference, was among the speakers. He presented a plenary talk on “The rationale for and challenge of embedding sustainability into higher education institutions” and a breakout talk on “Enhancing the sustainability of both university and community through interactive learning, service and research.”

The conference was quite interesting and animated, and Madam Ninh and her colleagues seemed pleased with the outcome and ready to move on to implementation considerations.
Project Bridge 2010-2011 is well underway, and this year’s Youth Ambassadors have already been selected. This year stood as one of the most competitive years for Project Bridge applicants. We received many applications from across Los Angeles and only twenty-five were chosen for a final interview. In choosing eight Youth Ambassadors from the many applicants, several desired qualities were sought in terms of group composition and individual character: diversity of cultural backgrounds, personalities, talents, and schools; open-minded, respectful, and mature persons; those motivated to learn and interact with others; critical thinkers with analytical skills; honesty; persons not overly committed to other activities; those potentially limited in resources and opportunities to travel abroad.

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We started this year’s program with an amazing welcome dinner on December 11th, 2010 at the Tahoe Korean Restaurant in Koreatown that not only the parents and the Youth Ambassadors but also PCI Board Member Adrienne Medawar and Mr. and Mrs. Spencer Kim joined as special guests. It was delightful to see the students bond so well on their first day of meeting.