2020 WJP Lecture Series

Amid the ongoing global Covid-19 pandemic, the 5th Annual William J. Perry Lecture Series has been postponed to December 10, 2020. While we had live audiences attending past lectures, this year’s lecture will be televised by one of the major Korean broadcasting companies. This televised event will have a small panel discussion with prominent journalists.

New Board Members

John Linton (Ihn Yo-han) is a South Korean physician, educator and director at Yonsei University Severance Hospital International Health Care Center. Linton received his Doctor of Medicine from Yonsei University College of Medicine and earned his Master of Science and Ph.D. in physiology from Korea University Graduate School of Medicine.

Linton began his career as a pediatric resident at Flushing Hospital, then a family medicine resident at the Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens prior to taking his current position.

Since 2008 he has served as a concurrent professor at the Graduate School of Medical Science and Engineering at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology while working as an advisor to the Korea International Cooperation Agency.

John Linton contributed to the development of the ambulance customized for Korea in 1992. His ambulance was remodeled to suit Korean geography. It is known to be the basis of the fire ambulance used today. He became the first special naturalized Korean citizen in 2012.

Linton also established the Eugene Bell Foundation in the U.S. in 1995 with his brother Stephen Linton and other descendants of Bell. The foundation aims to give humanitarian aid to North Korea.

Linton is the chairman of the Department of Family Medicine at Yongji University – College of Medicine, and president of the Korea Foundation for International Healthcare; board member of: Chollipo Arboretum, International Tuberculosis Research Center, Korea International Cooperation Agency, Seonam University, Independence Hall of Korea, Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, LG Welfare Foundation and Soonchun Tuberculosis Rehabilitation Center.

S. Nathan Park is an attorney with Kobre & Kim LLP’s Washington DC office. Mr. Park’s practice includes international litigation, arbitration and responses against cross-border government investigations, with a particular focus in Asia. As a legal academic, Mr. Park served as an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown Law Center from 2013 to 2019, and published articles with University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law and Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law. In addition, Mr. Park frequently comments as an expert of politics and economy of East Asia and South Korea on such outlets as CNN, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, Foreign Policy, the Atlantic, among others. Mr. Park holds a B.A. from University of California, Berkeley and J.D. from Columbia Law School.
Robert Gallucci: Thinking Through a New North Korea Strategy for Joe Biden

From the author:
Sanctions will not bring North Korea to its knees or cause it to give up nuclear weapons, but they do stand as evidence to Pyongyang that the DPRK will not soon be recognized as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. Viewed this way, they need not become an obstacle to progress towards normal political relations between the US and the North, and US could look forward to ending them as much as the North.

It would be surprising if a newly-elected President Biden did not rely on the advice of his senior foreign policy advisors from the Obama Administration and from his campaign when deciding upon what course to follow in dealing with North Korea. It is also likely that those regarded as experts on our security interests in Northeast Asia during the Obama years would play an important role, at least initially, in shaping North Korean policy in a new Biden Administration. That said, however, this does not necessarily tell us what that policy would look like in 2021.

After all, while the generalists and area experts who have a past association with the Vice President are, without exception, able, knowledgeable and experienced, it would be unfair to say that the policy they pursued for eight years nevertheless failed to remove or even diminish the threat posed by North Korea to America and its allies. Indeed, fairness would require that we acknowledge that the same lack of success characterized the policies of presidents Clinton and Bush, over the sixteen previous years.

In other words, we may not need new people to craft the new president’s policy, but we arguably need some new ideas to inform that policy. The first new idea would be to become agnostic over whether or not the North Koreans will ever give up their nuclear weapons. It is certainly fair, maybe even essential, to keep denuclearization as a policy objective, and still believe it unlikely that any of the North Korean leaders, including the current Kim, would have abandoned or will abandon nuclear weapons. But that is different from the posture of many of Washington’s experts who simply assert that it would never have happened and it will never happen. They, actually, don’t know that. The point here is that if we become serious about the possibility of achieving the objective of denuclearization, we will be forced to entertain steps that could plausibly bring it about.

The second new idea, then, is to seriously consider what a new relationship with North Korea might look like, and what changes in their policy and ours might be required to get there. Contemplating a dramatic reconsideration of relations in Northeast Asia cannot and should not be attempted without careful consideration of allied and Chinese reactions, recognizing that consultations aimed at reassuring the other interested parties will not be easy. In fact, it is not hard to imagine a new set of relations in the region that would give Pyongyang sufficient confidence to return to non-nuclear weapons status, while causing unease in other capitals, particularly Beijing.

Now that the world has a potent pandemic on its hands, the tension between China and the U.S. is idiotic. President Donald Trump says huffily that he is not even talking to President Xi Jinping these days.

The third new idea, to make this approach possible, is to abandon sanctions as the centerpiece of our policy, keeping them only to convey the illegitimacy of North Korean nuclear weapons. Sanctions will not bring North Korea to its knees or cause it to give up nuclear weapons, but they do stand as evidence to Pyongyang that the DPRK will not soon be recognized as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. Viewed this way, they need not become an obstacle to progress towards normal political relations between the US and the North, and the US could look forward to ending them as much as the North.

So, as important as it is to get the right advisors and policymakers, it’s the policy that matters. Old wine in new bottles won’t do, but new wine, even in old bottles, would be just fine.

Robert Gallucci is a professor at Georgetown University. He had been President of the MacArthur Foundation and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. As Ambassador at Large, he led the US side in negotiating the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994.
The truth about the “80 nuclear weapons”

A preemptive strike by either Pyongyang or Washington is highly improbable

“Rage,” the new book by Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, has been drawing much attention these days. The focus is on the truth of its quote about “80 nuclear weapons.” In an interview with Woodward, former US Secretary of Defense James Mattis said, “The Strategic Command in Omaha had carefully reviewed and studied OPLAN 5027 for regime change in North Korea -- the US response to an attack that could include the use of 80 nuclear weapons.”

A debate has unfolded among major South Korean media over how to interpret this sentence. The Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, and other conservative news outlets saw these 80 nuclear weapons as intended for a retaliatory strike by the US; conversely, the Hankyoreh interpreted them as the weapons that North Korea might use. The questions are the result of the ambiguous wording in the original sentence.

In a Sept. 14 interview with Woodward, US National Public Radio (NPR) broadcaster Mary Louise Kelly asked him to clarify this point. Woodward responded, “I think given North Korea is a rogue nation, they have, as I report, probably a couple of dozen nuclear weapons well-hidden and concealed that it scared Secretary of Defense Mattis so much that he would sleep in his gym clothes. There was a light in his bathroom as he - if he was in the shower and they detected a North Korean launch.” According to Woodward, Mattis was constantly worried that he might have to issue orders for a nuclear strike on North Korea.

Woodward went on to explain that US President Trump had “authorized Secretary of Defense Mattis on his own to shoot it [a North Korean missile] down. If Kim [Jong-un] saw that, he might launch all of his other weapons. I quote Mattis saying, ‘no one has a right to incinerate millions of people,’ but he had to face that. He was not worried that Trump was going to launch against North Korea preemptively. He believes that the problem was Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader.”

This explanation only compounds the confusion. North Korea is portrayed here as possessing around 24 nuclear weapons, which it could potentially use to incinerate millions of people. The remarks refer to the possibility of escalation -- a North Korean missile launch, a US strike, a massive retaliatory launch by North Korea -- but make no concrete mention of a preemptive strike or counter-strike by the US. The “80 nuclear weapons” are nowhere to be found.

The reference to “80 nuclear weapons” appears to have been problematic to begin with. As of late July 2017, nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker estimated North Korea as having 25 to 30 nuclear weapons; physicist David Albright put the number at 15 to 32, while US intelligence authorities have estimated as many as 60. This was also before it was discovered that North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are capable of a preemptive strike against the continental US. To be sure, North Korea could have launched strikes against South Korea and Japan even then with short-range or intermediate-range ballistic missiles, but the scenario of North Korea launching 80 nuclear weapons toward the continental US was far-fetched then and remains so now.

US strike against N. Korea poses several technical, geopolitical challenges involving Russia and China

The US possesses more than 80 nuclear weapons, and Trump could push the button at any time if he decides to. But it’s unlikely that the US would completely annihilate North Korea with a preemptive strike of 80 or more nuclear weapons.

Launching an ICBM strike against North Korea would require passing through Russian airspace. If that happens, there is a possibility that Russia will misinterpret it and take action in response. A better alternative would be to use forward-deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in Northeast Asia, but this approach could be similarly misinterpreted by China in light of the missiles’ flight angle. Neither approach is a technically simple option. This is why the US’ scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea have long centered on the use of strategic bombers such as the B-2 and B-52. But this too would be by no means simple: transporting 80 nuclear weapons to the region in a short space of time, neutralizing North Korea’s air defense network and command and control system, breaking down major air defense network bases with Tomahawk missiles and other weaponry, and finally using the bombers to conduct aerial nuclear weapon drops. An additional issue concerns the need to evacuate US Forces Korea family members and US citizens living in South Korea ahead of time. It is especially difficult to imagine a military action at this scale being decided and carried out with the consent or understanding of the South Korean government.

(continued on page 4)
Open Economy Project

The Pacific Century Institute announces a new project on the Asia-Pacific “Open Economy.” Led by Dr. Anyu Lee, a Stanford University engineer who has been active in technology industries and academia in both China and the United States, and Charles E. Morrison, PCI board member who formerly served as president of the East-West Center, the project was conceived in reaction to growing trade and technology conflicts between China and the United States and their negative impacts on the world.

In comparison to “free trade,” open economy implies more of a direction rather than an end point, accepting legitimate reasons to restrict, trade, capital and human flows. Other conceptual differences between free trade and open economy concepts will be explored. While most economists argue that freer trade has enormous benefits for productivity, wealth, and consumer and investor choice, they often minimize both the social and political impacts of adjustment as well as effects of differences in degrees of openness. Both have led to growing sentiment to reduce openness, undercutting the political support base for free and open trade in many countries, including China and the United States.

The project will address means of minimizing differences in international understanding of what an open economy implies and consider strategies to make globalization more equitable and inclusive, including for small business. Because of the covid-19 crisis, there will be a focus on the relationship between disease, medical supplies and the open economy. The pandemic demonstrated natural human reactions to hoard supplies and close off information flows as well as the weakness of international organizations to manage the crisis.

Project Bridge Alumni Corner

Litzy Santoyo, Project Bridge alumni (’18) and Concordia Language Villages’ (CLV) Sup sogŭi Hosu scholarship recipient is currently a sophomore majoring in Korean Literature and Culture at the University of California, Irvine (UCI). After coming across a Korean drama in high school, Litzy was impressed by the beauty of the Korean language, which led her to self study the language through books and YouTube videos. Seeing that her high school did not have a Korean club, Litzy decided to start a Korean club on her own at the school, recruiting faculty advisor and other interested students. The club still exists today and remains a testament to Litzy’s passion for the Korean language and culture. At UCI, Litzy continues her role as an ambassador by sharing her experience as Project Bridge participant. She recently shared why her studies are critical to building cultural understanding and to becoming a global citizen on UCI Humanities Dept. social media platform:

“In 2017, I participated as a youth ambassador for an L.A. based program called Project Bridge, where we learned about the culture and history of Korea. The main objective of the program was to bridge the cultural gaps among countries. At the end of the program, we visited S. Korea and it was the experience of a lifetime. From visiting historical sites to meeting high school students, I saw how important it is for us to become global citizens and really get to learn about other cultures, which is why I chose to major in Korean literature and culture. In order for bridges to form between people, we must take the first step in becoming more knowledgeable individuals.”

Litzy plans to return to Korea and her career goals remain open, but one consistent feature of how she envisions her future is that it will certainly include Korea.

The truth about the “80 nuclear weapons” (continued from page 3)

OPLAN 5027 never about regime change in N. Korea

Let’s go back to the beginning. The “OPLAN 5027” quote cited in Woodward’s book was not a plan for regime change in North Korea, but an operational plan for a combined South Korea-US response to a large-scale invasion of the South by North Korea; it includes no mention of the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, OPLAN 5027 had already been replaced by OPLAN 5015 in 2015. As excellent a reporter as Woodward may be, his knowledge of Korean Peninsula issues, nuclear strategy, and operational doctrine are unlikely to transcend the limits of the layperson’s perspective. We have no cause for hanging on to every sentence that might appear in his book.

A nuclear weapon is not a magic wand or the “One Ring.” It may be easy to talk about using nuclear weapons, but the results are grim. Seventy-five years ago, 70,000 to 80,000 citizens of Hiroshima were killed in an instant when a 13-kiloton atomic bomb was dropped by a US bomber; 69% of the city’s buildings were incinerated. As Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev stressed 35 years ago, a nuclear war “can never be won and must never be fought.” As we recall the significance of these words, our focus now should not be on using those “80 nuclear weapons,” but on eliminating them.
Since 2018, PCI has partnered up with the Concordia Language Villages’ (CLV) Sup sogŭi Hosu, to award scholarships to recent Project Bridge program graduates. This year’s scholarship recipient Maddy Coppersmith participated in a 4-week full immersion Korean language camp—fully online. Maddy shares her experience.

When I attended Concordia Language Villages over the summer for four weeks, I had an experience that I never thought I was going to get. Before COVID-19 I was supposed to go to Minnesota and attend camp for four weeks learning Korean. I would have been without technology, far from home and meet so many new people all while speaking Korean. But since COVID-19, everything changed. The program went all online and I would not be able to go to Minnesota or meet anyone in person. I thought for sure I would not be able to get as much out of it because it was online. I am glad to report that I was wrong- it was so much more than I expected.

I learned about Concordia through Ms. Pak, the coordinator for Project Bridge who presented the opportunity for a scholarship to attend Concordia. I applied because I have been learning Korean in school in a FLAG immersion program since Kindergarten and thought it was very interesting and a new experience, I wanted to further learn Korean language and culture.

On June 29, 2020 I started Concordia Language Villages via Zoom. The entire program was in Korean. We had an interview with one of the Korean teachers to evaluate a level of proficiency before camp had started. The 안내말씀 (the morning gathering) started by all the counselors introducing themselves in Korean. My FLAG immersion program at school ended at tenth grade so I had a whole year of not speaking Korean every day or studying it. It felt very odd at first that everything was in Korean but I adjusted quickly. Everyone else had Korean names and Korean was used 95% of the time. After the 안내말씀, we went to our small groups with a different teacher. Each level had a different class, my class had five students including me. Classes were Monday to Saturday.

After each class day, we had our choice activity. We had a new choice activity each week. A choice activity could be App Making club, Coding club, Sports club, or Crafts club. I did Taekwondo (태권도) for the first week and really enjoyed it. Taekwondo was on Zoom and all in Korean. I have never done Taekwondo before and I surprised myself with how much I enjoyed it and could do. I was not only learning different moves and positions but I learned more Korean words during the class.

After choice activity there is Study Hall during which you can do homework and ask your teacher questions. This Study Halls were very helpful because I could ask my teacher questions right away and didn’t have to wait. We could also review what we learned earlier in the day to refresh.

We had homework to do every day and it varied daily. Every morning we had to do a 해맞이 which is similar to a weather/news update. We would explain the weather where we lived, the date, and where we were from all in Korean. This was a way for us to practice our Korean speaking on our own. My class also had a daily journal and worksheet usually every day. At the end of every week, we had to record ourselves singing Korean songs provided for us. We sang traditional songs like Arirang (아리랑 ) and some fun upbeat songs such as, 개구리 노총각. The staff would provide the translations for the lyrics so we learned more Korean as we sang. The singing helped me a lot because I would get the songs stuck in my head and always ended up singing them around the house. Picking up Korean became easier after learning songs and doing a daily weather update.

As the weeks went on, I made friends with the people in my class and become better and more comfortable speaking, writing, reading and listening to Korean. We would have weekend programs with special guests that spoke to us about various topics. We met a North Korean defector, Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, and Kenny Park. I feel privileged to get to know these influential people and learned new topics about Korean culture and history. When we met a North Korean defector, we learned all about his story and life in North Korea. I would have never expected to learn or experience anything we did during the weekend program before I started Concordia. I was very excited to meet Ambassador Kathleen Stephens because I heard her speak at the Pacific Century Institute Annual Awards Dinner and thought she was very fascinating and was glad I could get another chance to get to know her.

I became a lot more comfortable in my Korean after these four weeks. Concordia is a great way to get immersion in the language and culture. Even though it was online I got a lot more out of the camp then I expected. After finishing Concordia, I am now interested in majoring in Korean Language in college next year, I am grateful to Project Bridge for the opportunity to experience Concordia.
It is with great pleasure that the Pacific Century Institute with CBOL Corporation and Proxy Place Gallery presents its 2021 calendar.

“The Memory of the War, Praying for Peace” exhibition, a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War (6.25), was held at the Proxy Place Gallery from June 13-26, 2020, for an opportunity to reflect on the history of the war in the Korean Peninsula. Through this exhibition, a group of international artists have expressed their views on the Korean War and peaceful unification in the Korean Peninsula through their works presented in this calendar.

Please contact us at pci@pacificcenturyinst.org if you wish to receive a copy of this calendar.